











































Strategic use of (un)certainty expressions
Citation for published version:
Lorson, A, Cummins, C & Rohde, H 2021, 'Strategic use of (un)certainty expressions', Frontiers in
Communication, vol. 6, 635156. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2021.635156
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3389/fcomm.2021.635156
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:




Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Aug. 2021
Strategic Use of (Un)certainty
Expressions
Alexandra Lorson*, Chris Cummins and Hannah Rohde
Linguistics and English Language, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Speakers have a number of options when introducing propositions which they take to
be uncertain: for instance, they can use verbs such as ‘know’, ‘believe’ or ‘think’. The
production of uncertainty expressions is highly context dependent. One promising
approach to capturing the semantic meaning of these expressions takes them to be
available only when the speaker’s confidence in the proposition exceeds some
threshold. However, it is unclear whether this approach deals satisfactorily with the
full range of usages of uncertainty expressions. For instance, speakers may also use
them to achieve social goals such as toning down the force of their assertion. In this
case they pursue another communicative goal than just being cooperative: they also
aim to be polite. The current study investigates the speakers’ motivations in choosing
between uncertainty expressions such as ‘believe’ or the factive ‘know’ in two
controlled contexts. More specifically, we show that speakers’ choice of expression
is influenced by (i) how likely they estimate an event to be and (ii) strategic
considerations relating to the communicative context in which they are working.
Thus, speakers adjust their language as a manipulative process. We situate these
results in the context of threshold semantics.
Keywords: (un)certainty expressions, modality markers, factive presuppositions, degrees of belief, communicative
strategies
1 INTRODUCTION
Speakers have access to a vast repertoire of tools, such as uncertainty expressions (e.g.,
‘believe’, ‘think’) and factive verbs (e.g., ‘know’, ‘notice’), to convey their degrees of belief
about a specific state of the world, or whether a particular event has taken place. Uncertainty in
communication and interaction has been theorised from different perspectives (e.g., Littlejohn
et al., 2017), several of which address the idea that the communicator’s goal in interaction is
often to reduce or manage their (cognitive) uncertainty (e.g., Berger and Calabrese, 1975;
Berger, 1995; Brashers, 2006). Work in linguistic semantics and pragmatics has paid particular
attention to the use of expressions that convey information about the (un)certainty of
propositional information, which constitute an important tool for reducing a hearer’s
uncertainty as to the current state of affairs in the world. Among these expressions are
verbs which take sentential complements and which convey different degrees of speaker
confidence in the factuality of those complements.
Factive verbs such as ‘know’ are argued to presuppose the truth of their complements, under
which assumption we might expect them to be used only by speakers who are certain about the
factuality of those complements. By contrast, verbs such as ‘believe’ convey no such presupposition.
For example, a speaker uttering (1a) might only have plausible reason for thinking that the glasses are
on the kitchen table. In contrast, in (1b) the speaker seems to convey certain knowledge about the
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location of the glasses. Focusing on the contrast between (1a) and
the bare assertion in (1c), the uncertainty expression in (1a) can
be understood to convey the speaker’s confidence (or the lack
thereof) in the truth of the proposition that the glasses are on the
kitchen table.
(1a). I believe that you left your glasses on the kitchen table.
(1b). I know that you left your glasses on the kitchen table.
(1c). You left your glasses on the kitchen table.
Recent work attempting to formalise the semantics of
uncertainty expressions (e.g., Yalcin, 2010; Lassiter, 2017) has
appealed to the idea of thresholds of probability: For any
expression there exists some threshold in the range [0, 1), and
an utterance containing that expression is true if the probability of
the event it describes exceeds this threshold. Given that
cooperative speakers are expected to provide as much relevant
information as they can (following Grice, 1975), we would
pragmatically expect a speaker to choose the utterance with
the highest threshold they can: that is, they should utter (1b)
rather than (1a) if they hold that the probability of the event
exceeds the threshold that would make (1b) true. Hence, the
hearer of (1a) might infer that the speaker is not certain enough to
assert (1b).
However, this inference relies on the assumption that there
is no reason for a speaker to have used a weaker alternative:
that is, to have said ‘believe’ when they were in a position to say
‘know’. In practice, we might intuit that a speaker will
sometimes opt for the weaker option despite their
knowledge state. One possible motivation for this would be
politeness. For example, suppose that a valuer has inspected a
painting which the owner thinks is worth a fortune, and the
valuer is certain that it is not. Out of politeness, they might still
utter (2a) rather than (2b).
(2a). I believe that your painting isn’t worth much.
(2b). I know that your painting isn’t worth much.
In this paper, we examine language users’ expectations
about the choice between ‘know’ and uncertainty
expressions such as ‘believe’. In particular, we investigate
the effect of the strength of evidence available to the
speaker, across two different scenarios in which the
expectations of appropriate speaker behavior differ. As such
we examine ways in which participants estimate speakers’
strategic use of (un)certainty expressions, or to phrase it
differently, ways in which they posit that speakers may be
using language as a manipulative tool. Our broad aim is to
explore the usefulness of a threshold semantics approach in
capturing language usage in this domain. In experiment 1, we
look at a variety of verbs conveying different degrees of belief:
‘know’, ‘notice’, ‘to be sure’, ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘see’, ‘guess’.
Henceforth, we will use the term (un)certainty expressions
when referring both to uncertainty expressions and to
factive verbs. In experiment 2 we will zoom in onto the
(un)certainty expressions ‘believe’ and ‘know’.
2 PREVIOUS WORK ON UNCERTAINTY
EXPRESSIONS
2.1 Threshold Semantics
Uncertainty expressions indicate the degree to which speakers are
committed to the content of their utterances and reveal the
speakers’ knowledge about the truth of the presented
proposition. Interlocutors rely on contextual factors to
produce and interpret uncertainty expressions, since there is
no straightforward translation between uncertainty expressions
and event probabilities (Clark, 1990). For example, hearers have
been found to have difficulties in understanding verbal
probability descriptors such as ‘common’ when being
informed about the risk of medical side effects Knapp et al.
(2004).
One way of formalising uncertainty expressions, semantically,
would be to assume a threshold semantics (Yalcin, 2010; Lassiter,
2017): For any expression there exists some threshold [0, 1), and
an utterance containing that expression is true if the probability of
the event it describes exceeds this threshold. For example, if the
threshold for ‘believe’ is 0.6, then the utterance ‘I believe that
Scotland will win the match tomorrow’ is available for a speaker
who believes that the probability of Scotland winning the match
tomorrow exceeds the threshold of 0.6. Thus, a threshold
semantics account acknowledges the influence of context on
the interpretation of uncertainty expressions with regards to
varying event probabilities.
However, research suggests that the usage of (un)certainty
expressions is more dynamic than predicted by threshold
accounts. For example, there is a considerable amount of
inter-speaker variability (e.g., Wallsten et al., 1986) that might
not be explainable with varying event probabilities. In a recent
study, Schuster and Degen (2020) suggest that hearers use the
speaker’s identity when interpreting utterances: what expressions
does a speaker preferably use and what thresholds do they
associate with specific expressions? Schuster and Degen
(2020)’s study tests how hearers adapt to speaker-specific
thresholds when interpreting uncertainty expressions. In one
part of their study, participants were asked to listen to either a
cautious or confident speaker producing a bare assertion or
utterances containing ‘probably’ or ‘might’. The confident
speaker would use ‘might’ and ‘probably’ to describe lower
event probabilities than a cautious speaker. Participants were
then asked to make guesses about the production of the speaker
they were introduced to in the first part choosing between ‘might’,
‘probably’ and a something else option. The results show that
participants in the confident speaker condition gave high ratings
for ‘probably’ for a larger range of event probabilities than for
‘probably’ in the cautious speaker condition. For ‘might’ the
opposite was observed: participants gave high ratings for
‘might’ for a larger range of event probabilities in the cautious
speaker condition than in the confident speaker condition. In a
third experiment, participants inferred higher event probabilities
for ‘might’ and ‘probably’when produced by the cautious speaker
than the confident speaker. Thus, hearers seem to be able to adjust
to speaker-specific thresholds, e.g., use higher thresholds for
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expressions such as ‘probably’ when interpreting utterances
communicated by a cautious speaker.
Schuster and Degen (2020)’s findings suggest that hearers
adapt to the speakers’ identity. Crucially, this line of research
focused on the utility of an utterance as being determined
primarily by its informativeness and the speakers’ utterance
preference. Thus, speakers aim to reduce uncertainty for the
hearer by choosing the most informative utterance while also
having personal preferences as to which utterance to choose.
As was pointed out by Schuster and Degen (2020), while these
considerations successfully capture inter-speaker variability, it
is not clear how such an approach would capture the effect of
additional communicative goals speakers may have when
using uncertainty expressions. For example, a speaker may
use ‘might’ to make a statement more moderate, or to be
polite—goals which may vary by context even for the same
speaker and which conflict with the goal of presenting the
strongest possible information, in order to reduce uncertainty




It has long been noted that uncertainty expressions that convey
modal meaning also give rise to particular discourse effects (e.g.,
Fraser, 1975; Holmes, 1982). Uncertainty expressions may
function as downtoners (Holmes, 1982) or hedges weakening
the assertive strength of an utterance, and yielding discourse
effects such as vagueness or politeness. The concept of hedges was
popularised by Lakoff (1973) to capture linguistic expressions,
such as ‘sort of’, that can signal different degrees of category
membership of a particular expression, see (3).
(3) This paper is sort of long.
This type of hedging was later called propositional hedging
(Fraser, 1975), since the hedge affects the truth value of the
propositional content. Hedging was further investigated by
Brown and Levinson (1978) who extended hedging to
expressions that modify the speaker’s commitment to a
proposition, such as ‘think’ (sometimes discussed as speech act
hedges Fraser, 2010). This type of hedging is the focus of this
paper. For example in (4), a teacher might want to gently
introduce the subject about a pupil having to repeat the 4th
grade to the parents (4a) than to directly assert it (4b).
(4a). I believe that your son will have to repeat the 4th grade.
(4b). Your son will have to repeat the 4th grade.
Within politeness theory (Brown and Levinson, 1987), being
polite is often analysed through the lens of facework: that is, the
interlocutors’ aim to maintain their positive or negative face.
Whereas positive face reflects the interlocutors’maintenance of a
positive self-image, negative face reflects the interlocutors’
freedom to act on their own terms. Face-threatening actions
can damage the face of either the speaker or hearer. For example,
in a scenario where two teachers are discussing a student’s mark,
see (5), Teacher2 is threatening their colleagues’ positive face by
criticizing them. Similarly, this situation could be potentially face
threatening for Teacher2 because they could come across as
uncompassionate. A strategy to lessen the severity of the
threat would be the use of an uncertainty expression such as
‘believe’ (5a)—i.e., hedging—instead of asserting the criticism
directly (5b).
(5). Teacher1: This essay was submitted on time.
(5a). Teacher2: I believe you are mistaken; the student submitted
the essay a day late.
(5b). Teacher2: You are mistaken; the student submitted the
essay a day late.
Empirical research suggests that speakers indeed consider
motives such as politeness when communicating their degrees
of belief. Juanchich and Sirota (2015) investigated the way in
which speakers communicate more or less face-threatening news
to their friend. More specifically, participants were confronted
with a scenario that had less severe consequences (friend’s car
breaking down), and another that had more severe consequences
(friend making a bad investment). Both events were characterised
as being 50% likely to occur. Juanchich and Sirota (2015)’s
findings suggest that tactful speakers who are concerned about
the hearer hedge their utterances, understating their confidence
by using expressions such as ‘a very small probability’, ‘a small
probability’, ‘slightly probable’.
Holtgraves and Perdew (2016) extended this line of research
by looking at scenarios with varying event probabilities (20, 50,
and 80%) from the production and comprehension
perspective. The findings of a production task indicate that
speakers hedge their utterances by using expressions
conveying lower degrees of belief when hearers are more
severely affected by the event the speakers are describing
(e.g., ‘It’s somewhat unlikely/likely that the car needs a new
transmission.’). This was the case even when both
events—severe and less severe—were equally likely.
From the hearers’ perspective, Holtgraves and Perdew
(2016) found that participants assigned high probabilities
(value ranging from 0 to 100) to a given event when
hearing expressions conveying high certainties, such as
‘definitely’ (e.g., ‘The car definitely needs a new battery/
transmission.’). At the same time, participants assigned
lower probabilities to severe events (car needs a new
transmission) than for less severe events (car needs a new
battery). This is a striking result in the context of prior research
by Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2006) showing that participants
tend to judge severe negative outcomes to be more likely than
the speaker conveys. Taken together, these studies suggest that
speakers downplay the probability of severe adverse events but
hearers are aware of this and compensate accordingly in their
interpretation. In general, speakers who use hedging strategies
are perceived as less authoritative and confident than those
who do not (Hosman, 1989; Crismore and Kopple, 1997). At
the same time, speakers are also perceived as warmer, as we
might predict if hearers take into account politeness theoretic
constraints.
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2.2.2 Power Dynamics
The severity of a face threatening action depends partly on the
power relation between the interlocutors (Brown and Levinson,
1987). Low-power speakers may be more concerned about
facework than speakers who have the same or a higher social
status than the hearer. For example, if a teacher were talking to
their student, as in (6), rather than a colleague, as in (5), they
might be less inclined to resort to hedging (6b) and more inclined
to contradict the speaker directly (6a).
(6). Student: I submitted my essay on time.
(6a). Teacher: You are mistaken; you submitted the essay a
day late.
(6b). Teacher: I believe you are mistaken; you submitted the essay
a day late.
The previously discussed studies show that speakers use hedging
when they are on a par with the hearer (communicating with
friends, Juanchich and Sirota (2015)) or in a lower social position
(communicating with parents, Holtgraves and Perdew, 2016). It is
less clear to what extent high-power speakers engage in facework.
From the hearers’ perspective, high-power hearers (role of parent)
may dismiss the possibility that the low-power speaker (child) could
use hedging (Holtgraves and Perdew, 2016). On the other hand, as
shown by Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2006) in the context of
medical communication, low-power hearers (patients) appear to
be aware that a high-power speaker (doctor) may hedge their
statements.
However, the effects of power relations might arise here for
two separate reasons: because the bare assertion is taken to be
face-threatening to the hearer in a way that is inappropriate in the
presence of a particular power dynamic, or because the risk to the
speaker of making a false statement is higher in such a case. That
is, it’s not obvious whether the speaker who hedges does so
because they could confidently make a stronger statement but
that would be inappropriate, or because they require higher
confidence to make a stronger statement in the presence of an
unfavourable power dynamic. In a threshold semantics analysis,
this latter case could be treated as a case in which the threshold for
making the stronger statement has increased. For example,
immediately after the vote count for the 2020 US presidential
election, Republican senators who refused to say that Trump had
lost may have done so because they feared reprisals for saying so
even though they thought it was certainly true, or because they
didn’t want to take the risk of asserting his defeat falsely in a
circumstance where they thought he might still have a very slim
chance of winning.
Previous studies have singled out specific power dynamics.
One way of interpreting these findings is as evidence of speakers’
selection of communicative strategies. Criticising someone who is
in a high-power position requires a different strategy than
criticising someone who is in a low-power position. A
successful strategy for a low-power speaker could be to hedge/
downplay their certainty about their interlocutor’s mistake.
However, there are scenarios where a speaker might choose a
quite different strategy: conveying high certainties. For example,
in a scenario where the hearer is thought to have lied about what
they did last night and the speaker has at least a suspicion about
what the hearer was up to, the speaker might want to act as if they
are already certain about what the hearer did in order to elicit a
strong reaction and ultimately learn the truth. Ways of conveying
high certainty would include using the bare assertion, see (7b), or
to use ‘know’ (7a).
(7a). I know that you went to the party without me.
(7b). You went to the party without me.
Note that the use of the factive presupposition trigger ‘know’,
although indirect, might confer an advantage over using the bare
assertion: by using ‘know’ the speaker not only conveys that they
are highly certain that the hearer went to the party without them
but also acts as if this content is a fact and something that
everyone including the hearer can agree on. By definition,
presuppositions are presumably already shared knowledge. If
presupposed content happens to be new, one way of repair is
for the interlocutors to accommodate the presupposition: that is,
to act as if it was in the common ground. Presupposed content
triggered by ‘know’—the interlocutor being at the party without
the speaker—might be less likely to be challenged by the hearer,
even if it is in fact controversial. Lorson et al. (2019) contrasted
the usage of assertions vs. presuppositions and their findings
suggested that (formally) presupposed content was less likely to
be challenged by the hearer than asserted content.
In summary, speakers use uncertainty expressions to
communicate their degrees of belief. The willingness to use
particular expressions seems to vary between speakers, and
interlocutors are flexible in adapting to each other’s
production preferences. But, at the same time, speakers may
also use a certain expression when the event they are describing
does not exceed the threshold of that expression. The thresholds
of uncertainty expressions seem to vary between interlocutors
and interlocutors seem to be flexible when it comes to adjusting to
each other’s way of using uncertainty expressions. On top of that,
speakers may use uncertainty expressions as hedging devices or
downtoners following communicative goals such as being polite.
Thus, it seems that there are a multitude of factors contributing in
different ways to the speakers’ production of uncertainty
expressions. In this paper, we explore whether we can appeal
to a threshold-based semantic analysis to systematise the effects
of these competing considerations.
3 THE PRESENT STUDY
The current study investigates the speakers’ motivations in
choosing between uncertainty expressions such as ‘believe’ or
factive verbs such as ‘know’. More specifically, we explore
whether participants’ choices of expressions are influenced by
(i) how likely they estimate an event to be and (ii) strategic
considerations relating to the communicative context in which
they are working. We will extend previous research by
introducing a different way of assessing participants’ degrees
of belief, and by introducing a within-subjects manipulation
that examines the effect of context on a speaker’s strategic
utterance choice.
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The majority of studies that we discussed have used quantitative
prompts to manipulate the probability that an event takes place.
Using probabilities is problematic for three reasons: (i) In daily life
speakers don’t usually know the exact probability with which an
event takes place; (ii) speakers rely on evidence/arguments/
experience/intuition rather than reasoning about event
probabilities when communicating degrees of belief; (iii)
interlocutors usually perform quite poorly when it comes to
understanding probabilities (Kahneman, 2011). In our study, we
ask participants to choose between utterances to produce, while
showing them pictures and documents that can be implicitly
evaluated for the event certainty they denote. We assess the
participants’ degree of belief after the production task by asking
participants to rate how likely they thought that a specific event took
place given a piece of evidence. By taking this approach, we aim to
elicit production choices and event certainty judgements that are
more similar to those occurring in daily communication.
Prior work has shown that participants can adjust to speaker-
specific utterance thresholds. Here we ask whether speakers’ use
of (un)certainty expressions also varies depending on the scenario
they are in and who they are talking to. We target two scenarios
that vary in their power dynamics to compare production choices
made by a speaker in a high-power position to those made by a
speaker on a par with their interlocutor. The advantage of a
within-subjects manipulation (in contrast to prior work that has
tested only one power dynamic or another) is that we can
examine the extent of context-specific adaptation while
holding the speaker constant. In our study, we test whether
participants adapt to a change of context to change the way
they convey their (un)certainty.
We conducted two experiments—the first experiment examines
seven (un)certainty expressions and the second experiment focuses
on ‘know’ vs. ‘believe’. Both involved a production task where
participants were asked to choose between utterances to convey
messages about different events, followed by an evaluation task
where participants were asked to adjust a slider to indicate their
evaluation of the certainty of those events. Note that, while we
characterise this primarily as a production task, participants’
choices in this task can also be understood to involve elements
of comprehension: the participant is asked to indicate what a
character in a scene is likely to say, by evaluating and choosing
among different candidate utterances. This decision-making
process reflects language users’ awareness that what they say is
guided by how it may be understood by the hearer, meaning that
speakers and hearers engage in what can be termed ’mutual
vigilance’ (Sperber et al., 2010). The only difference between
these experiments in terms of task is the number of utterances
participants had to choose from. The full set of data for both
experiments is available here: https://osf.io/e5av9/.
3.1 Experiment 1: Seven (Un)certainty
Expressions
In the first experiment we investigated the production of a wide
range of (un)certainty expressions (‘know’, ‘notice’, ‘to be sure’,
‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘see’, ‘guess’) in two controlled, contrasting
scenarios. The goal of this experiment was to (i) test the
experimental design and the materials and (ii) narrow down
which (un)certainty expressions we should contrast in the second
experiment.
The experiment consisted of two tasks. For the production
task, participants were asked to play the role of a detective in an
investigation of an art heist where they briefed a colleague and
interrogated a suspect, relying on pieces of evidence about the
suspect’s whereabouts. In this way we elicited expressions that
correspond to degrees of belief without providing explicitly
quantitative prompts. After the production task, participants
then evaluated their confidence in each piece of evidence
retrospectively. We call this evaluation our evidentiality
measure. Thus, participants produce utterances in two
scenarios corresponding to a range of confidence levels in the
propositions uttered.
We expect participants to be pragmatically cooperative in the
sense of producing the most informative statement that they
truthfully can. If the threshold-based account of the semantics of
these verbs is correct, we would expect speakers to select the verb
with the highest threshold that does not exceed their degree of
belief in the complement proposition. This means that, assuming
‘know’ has a higher threshold than ‘believe’, speakers are
predicted to choose ‘believe’ over ‘know’ as long as the
probability of the event they are describing does not exceed
the threshold for ‘know’. Following Schuster and Degen
(2020)’s results, we expect speakers to differ in their
thresholds for producing specific expressions.
Considering work in the domain of politeness theory, we
generally predict that verbs expressing higher degrees of belief
will be more widely used in the interrogation than in the briefing.
We examine whether this difference can be captured by assuming
that the scenario exerts a general effect on the thresholds for
producing particular utterances. This is based on the assumption
that speakers might have a systematic tendency to downplay their
certainty when speaking to their colleague in a cooperative
scenario, compared to when they are interacting with a
suspect in an uncooperative scenario. We could also
reformulate this in terms of power relations: In the
interrogation the speaker is in a high-power position
compared to the briefing, which potentially obviates their need
to consider politeness constraints.
3.1.1 Participants
We tested 35 participants recruited over the crowd-sourcing
platform Prolific, specifying participants with an approval rate
above 90. Participants were paid an average of £7.53/h (the
average duration of the experiment was 35 min). The age of
the participants ranged from 18 to 52 years, with a mean of
24 years 23 participants stated their preferred pronoun as she/her,
11 chose he/him and 1 chose they/their.
3.1.2 Design and Materials
For the production task, each participant was exposed to both
scenarios, Briefing and Interrogation. The order of scenario was
counterbalanced across participants. Each critical item was
presented to each participant once, either in the Briefing or
Interrogation scenario, and paired either with evidence that we
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estimated to be weak in evidentiality or evidence that we
considered to be strong in evidentiality. However, for the
analysis, we did not rely on this categorisation of evidential
strength, but instead on the participants’ evaluation of that in
a post-test (see below). In order to ensure that participants saw a
particular item only once but at the same time were exposed to
both scenarios, we introduced two suspects. In this way,
participants interrogated suspect1 and briefed about suspect2
or the other way round. This yielded 40 critical items: 10 briefing
items per suspect and 10 interrogation items per suspect, each
accompanied by either weak or strong evidence. Participants
consequently saw 20 of these items—10 briefing items and 10
interrogation items, each scenario being about a different
suspect. In each scenario block we used 20 filler items of
which 10 were control items which functioned as attention
checks. Within each scenario block the order of the items was
randomised.
The critical items consisted of a picture containing a question/
answer pair and a picture of a piece of evidence. The picture with
the question/answer pair set the scene for the scenario
manipulation: Either participants saw a picture of a briefing
room facing a colleague, or they saw an interrogation room
where they would be confronted with a suspect; see
Supplementary Material for full details. The question in the
heading of the picture was meant to be an already asked question
by the participant. The answer to the question was provided by
either the colleague or suspect, depending on the scenario, in
form of a speech bubble. The participants were asked to react to
the colleague’s/suspect’s answer by filling the gap in a sentence by
choosing between ‘know’, ‘notice’, ‘to be sure’, ‘think’, ‘believe’,
‘see’, or ‘guess’, highlighted in the briefing (8) and (9) items.
Alternatively, they were able to choose the option ‘other’ and
formulate their own utterance. The order in which the
expressions were displayed was randomised.
(8) Briefing item:
Participant: Did Emily Brown have any financial problems?
Colleague: Financially the suspect was doing alright.
Participant: I ___ that the suspect was in need of money.
[know∣∣∣∣believe∣∣∣∣notice∣∣∣∣amsure∣∣∣∣think∣∣∣∣see∣∣∣∣guess]
(9) Interrogation item:
Participant: Did you have any financial problems?
Suspect: Financially I was doing alright.
Participant: I ___ that you were in need of money.
[know∣∣∣∣believe∣∣∣∣notice∣∣∣∣amsure∣∣∣∣think∣∣∣∣see∣∣∣∣guess]
The manipulated pieces of evidence ranged from pictures to
statements. As was mentioned above, we roughlymanipulated the
evidence to be weak or strong but will rely on the participants’
evaluation of the evidence in our analysis. For example, for the
items (8) and (9) we provided a bank statement as strong evidence
and a statement of a friend who mentions potential, financial
difficulties as weak evidence; see Supplementary Material for full
details.
The filler items were turns between the suspect/colleague and
the participant that had nothing to do with the case. For the 10
control items, the information was provided in the picture and
the participant had to choose the correct answer (here 11am), see
(10). The option ‘other’ was also available.
(10) Control item:Picture: Clock in rooms says it is 11am.
Participants: Oh look at the time. Is it
already? [11am∣∣∣∣noon∣∣∣∣2pm]
After the production task, participants were asked to evaluate
the pieces of evidence they had seen in both scenarios: Given the
piece of evidence below, how certain are you that p?, where p is the
complement proposition from earlier in the experiment. This
would have been either the bank statement (strong evidence) or
the statement of a friend (weak evidence), depending on which
piece of evidence they had seen in the preceding scenario.
Participants saw 20 pieces of evidence in total. Each piece of
evidence dealt with a separate proposition which is why we
assume that evidentiality ratings will not be influenced by
anything else taking place in the experiment before we ask
participants to rate the evidence. To communicate their
certainty, participants adjusted a slider from 0 (not at all
certain) to 100 (very certain).
3.1.3 Procedure
Before the experiment, participants were asked to give informed
consent to take part in a fictional investigation of an art heist in
the role of a detective. We also informed them about the structure
of the experiment: (1) production task, engaging in two
discussions, (2) rating evidence, (3) demographic
questionnaire. Then the task was introduced in the form of a
story about an art heist in Edinburgh involving two suspects.
Since the lead detective on the case went missing, we asked the
participants to help out solving the case. Both scenarios were
introduced by stating that one of the suspects had been arrested.
The participants were then asked either to prepare for the
interrogation of the suspect with a colleague (Briefing
scenario) or to interrogate the suspect right away
(Interrogation scenario). Participants were instructed to
converse with the colleague/suspect about different topics
including questions about the case and they were told that for
parts of the interaction they would need to look at the evidence
that had been collected. In the Briefing scenario we then asked
them to find the best way to help their colleague, and in the
Interrogation scenario to find the best way to interrogate the
suspect. After having completed the production task we asked
participants to rate the quality of the pieces of evidence they had
seen. The evaluation task was followed by the voluntary,
demographic questionnaire. The experiment lasted
approximately 35 min.
3.1.4 Analysis
We analysed our data fitting a Bayesian categorical regression
model with maximal random effects structure using the R (R Core
Team, 2020) package brms (Bürkner, 2018) which provides an
interface to fit Bayesian mixed models using Stan (Stan
Development Team, 2017). The Bayesian framework was
chosen because the models with maximal random effects
structure did not converge in the frequentist framework. Since
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Bayesian models can fall back to prior information they converge
more easily. We chose not to analyse our data with a reduced
effects structure within the frequentist framework to prevent
inflated false positive effects (Barr et al., 2013).
The experimental factor scenario (Briefing/Interrogation) and
the continuous variable evidentiality ([0,100]), were included to
predict the probability of choosing ‘believe’/‘notice’/‘am sure’/
‘think’/‘see’ over ‘know’. This makes ‘know’ the reference
category of the model. The factor scenario was sum-coded: −1
as Interrogation and 1 as Briefing. Evidentiality was standardised,
such that the variable was centred at zero with a standard
deviation of 1. The model included varying intercepts and
slopes for participants and items, assuming that the effect of
scenario and evidentiality on the participants’ utterance choices
varies between participants and items.
We used weakly regularising priors, which allowed a
reasonably wide range of parameter values and at the same
time penalised very extreme values. The priors for the by-
expression intercepts were normal distributions with mean 0
and standard deviation 10. This means that we are 68% certain
that the by-expression intercepts would fall within −10 and 10 on
the log-odds scale which translates approximately to a range of 0
and 1 on the probability scale. For both fixed effects, we used
normal priors with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
Random effects were modelled as a correlation matrix and a
vector of standard deviations. The standard deviations were
assigned half-normal priors with a mean of 0, and a standard
deviation of 1. For the correlation matrix, a LKJ(2) prior was used
such that smaller correlations are favored over extreme values
such as ±1 (Sorensen et al., 2016; Stan Development Team, 2017).
Samples were drawn from the posterior distributions of the
model parameters using the NUTS sampler (Hoffman and
Gelman, 2013). Four sampling chains were run, each
collecting 4,000 iterations whereby the first 1,000 iterations
were disregarded as part of the warm-up phase leading to
12,000 iterations available for analysis.
Unlike the frequentist analysis, the Bayesian analysis will not
produce point estimates but instead posterior distributions over
parameters quantifying the probability of each possible parameter
value given the data. We will report the posterior mean β̂ and the
95% credible interval (95%-CrI). The 95%-CrI is the range
around the posterior mean within which the true value of the
parameter lies with a probability of 0.95. We could roughly
interpret the evidence as reliable if zero lies outside the
parameters’ 95% credible interval (Kruschke et al., 2012).
The response ‘other’ was excluded from the analysis. We
included ‘other’ mainly to give participants more freedom in
their utterance choice and to create a more natural experience.
The response ‘other’ made up only 8% of the data.
3.1.5 Results
The accuracy of participants was at 95% for the control items
which suggest that they paid attention during the experiment.
Overall, participants used a wide range of expressions, see Table 1
for details. ‘Guess’ was attested much less frequently than the
other options, so we omit it from the detailed statistical analysis.
In the evaluation task, participants assessed the evidence by
using the whole range of the slider: the evidentiality ratings
ranged from 0 to 100, with a mean of 72. Furthermore,
evidentiality ratings varied between utterances. Participants
used ‘know’ when they saw fairly convincing evidence (mean
evidentiality rating was 81), whereas they used ‘think’ for weaker
evidence (mean evidentiality rating was 62); see Table 2 for
details.
Contrasting the by-expression evidentiality ratings for both
scenarios reveals that, overall, the median evidentiality ratings
across expressions were lower for events mentioned in the
interrogation than in the briefing; see Figure 1. The only
exception is ‘am sure’. If we were to assume that the median
evidentiality ratings give us insight to the thresholds of the
individual expressions, the following order of expression
threshold for each scenario emerges:
Briefing :
know > notice> see> believe> am sure> think
Interrogation :
know > see> am sure> notice> believe> think
Compared to the briefing, ‘see’ and ‘am sure’ are much higher
ranked in the interrogation, whereas ‘notice’ and ‘believe’ move
down in the ranking. The differences in order between the two
scenarios would be surprising if one were to strictly assume that
speakers choose the expression with the highest possible
threshold compatible with their degrees of belief.
For the expressions ‘notice’, ‘am sure’, ‘think’ and ‘believe’, an
increase in evidentiality meant a decrease in log-odds. This effect
was most pronounced for ‘think’ (β̂ −1.13, CrI:[−1.55, −0.73]),
and weakest for ‘notice’ (β̂ −0.38, CrI:[−0.88, 0.18]), see Table 3
for all expressions. This suggests that averaging over scenarios,
speakers are less likely to choose ‘notice’, ‘am sure’, ‘think’ or
‘believe’ than ‘know’ when they are highly certain about the
content they want to communicate. The effect was absent for the
TABLE 1 | Raw counts for each utterance of the first experiment ordered from









TABLE 2 | Mean evidentiality ratings by utterance for the experiment 1.
Response Mean SD Median Min Max
know 81 19 83.0 16 100
notice 72.3 23.3 71.5 15 100
am sure 73 22.3 75.5 20 100
see 79.3 22.2 81.0 0 100
think 62.2 28.2 63.5 0 100
believe 67.4 22.5 70 0 100
guess 54.2 18.7 60 15 74
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expression ‘see’ (β̂ 0, CrI:[−0.41, 0.44]) which suggests that,
averaging over scenarios, speakers are free to choose ‘know’ or
‘see’ when they are highly certain.
The effect of scenario was overall less pronounced than the
effect of evidentiality. For the expressions ‘am sure’, ‘think’ and
‘believe’, the probability to be chosen increased in the briefing and
decreased in the interrogation. This effect was most pronounced
for ‘am sure’ (β̂ 0.84, CrI:[0.35, 1.39]), followed by ‘think’
(β̂ 0.69, CrI:[0.36, 1.02]) and ‘believe’ (β̂ 0.47, CrI:[0.18,
0.77]). This suggests that, given average evidentiality, speakers
choose ‘am sure’, ‘think’ or ‘believe’ in preference to ‘know’ in the
briefing, but less so in the interrogation. The effect was absent for
‘notice’ (β̂ 0.18, CrI:[−0.19, 0.56]) and ‘see’ (β̂ 0.12, CrI:[−0.21,
0.44]). This suggests that given average evidentiality, the extent of
speakers’ preference for ‘know’ over ‘see’ and ‘notice’ is
independent of scenario.
Overall, the findings suggests that in the briefing, stronger
evidence was needed in order for participants to choose
expressions associated with a high degree of certainty such
as ‘know’. In the interrogation, however, less convincing
evidence might have sufficed. Furthermore, evidentiality
was found to play a bigger role than scenario in expression
choice.
3.1.6 Interim Summary
The results of the first experiment suggest that speakers indeed
base their utterance choices on their degrees of believe and
moreover adjust their choices depending on the scenario they
are in. Overall, participants chose (un)certainty expressions
associated with lower degrees of belief more often in the
briefing than in the interrogation. For example, ‘think’, and
‘believe’ received lower mean evidentiality ratings than ‘know’
(62 and 67 respectively, see Table 2), and were more likely to
be used in the briefing than in the interrogation. There were no
differences between scenarios for ‘know’ and ‘see’ and the
mean evidentiality ratings for ‘see’ (79.3) were almost as high
as the ones for ‘know’ (81). The results of ‘am sure’ and ‘notice’
are less straightforward to interpret: While ‘am sure’ was more
often used in the briefing than in the interrogation, we find no
effect of scenario for ‘notice’, despite both expressions having
received almost the same evidentiality ratings (73 and 72
respectively).
FIGURE 1 | By-expression evidentiality ratings for each scenario (briefing in blue, interrogation in red). The plot shows the median of the evidentiality ratings (line)
and the upper quartile and lower quartile (box). Whiskers extend to the scores outside the quartiles. Dots represent outliers.
TABLE 3 | Population-level estimates of the categorical regression model in log-










notice Intercept −1.39 0.31 −2.06 −0.84 1.00
am sure Intercept −2.03 0.46 −3.05 −1.26 1.00
see Intercept −0.95 0.24 −1.47 −0.52 1.00
think Intercept −0.70 0.26 −1.25 −0.21 1.00
believe Intercept 0.02 0.23 −0.43 0.47 1.00
notice Evidentiality −0.38 0.27 −0.88 0.18 1.00
am sure Evidentiality −0.62 0.26 −1.12 −0.10 1.00
see Evidentiality 0.00 0.22 −0.41 0.44 1.00
think Evidentiality −1.13 0.20 −1.55 −0.73 1.00
believe Evidentiality −0.77 0.21 −1.19 −0.36 1.00
notice Scenario1 0.18 0.19 −0.19 0.56 1.00
am sure Scenario1 0.84 0.26 0.35 1.39 1.00
see Scenario1 0.12 0.17 −0.21 0.44 1.00
think Scenario1 0.69 0.17 0.36 1.02 1.00
believe Scenario1 0.47 0.15 0.18 0.77 1.00
In the table the by-expression intercepts are listed first, then the estimates for the
evidentiality effect followed by the estimates for the scenario effect. The effect scenario is
the change in log-odds for the briefing (-1 interrogation, 1 briefing). R̂ is a convergence
diagnostic which compares the between- and within-chain estimates. Values larger than
1 suggest that the chains have not mixed well.
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On the face of it, the results of the first experiment suggest a
complex pattern of usage preferences without clear indications of
the kind of stratification of choices that would be predicted by
threshold semantics account. However, it is possible that this
reflects the crowded space of possible options, and differences of
opinion between participants as to the relative strength of, for
instance, ‘believe’ and ‘am sure’. Hence, in the following
experiment, we constrain the space of choices further in a bid
to obtain clearer results. Specifically, we consider ‘know’ in
comparison with ‘believe’ across a wide range of confidence
levels (‘know’ for higher, and ‘believe’ for lower confidence
levels). We use ‘believe’ rather than ‘think’ because ‘believe’
was chosen by participants more frequently.
3.2 Experiment 2: ‘Know’ Versus ‘Believe’
In the second experiment, we aimed to investigate the usage of (un)
certainty expressions further by focusing on ‘know’ and ‘believe’
based on the results of the first experiment. The experimental
design, materials and procedure are the same as for the first
experiment with the difference that participants could only
choose between ‘know’, ‘believe’ and ‘other’. Similar to the first
experiment our hypothesis is that speakers decide between ‘know’
and the epistemically weaker option ‘believe’, depending on (i) their
degree of confidence, (ii) and the communicative setting they are in.
3.2.1 Participants
We tested 85 participants recruited over the crowd-sourcing platform
Prolific, specifying participants with an approval rate above 90 and
restricted to people that had not previously participated in
experiment 1. Participants were paid with an average of £7.53/h
(the average duration of the experiment was 30min). After data
collection two participants were excluded because their accuracy for
the control itemswas below chance level. The age of the remaining 83
participants ranged from 18 to 66 years, with a mean of 32 years 50
participants stated their preferred pronoun as she/her, 32 chose he/
him and 1 chose they/their.
3.2.2 Materials
The materials were the same as for the first experiment, see
Section 3.1.2. The only difference was that the utterance choice
was limited to ‘believe’ and ‘know’, see (11) as an example for the
Briefing scenario.
(11) Briefing item: Participant: Did Emily Brown have any
financial problems? Colleague: Financially the suspect was
doing alright. Participant: I that the suspect was in need of
money. [know|believe]
3.2.3 Procedure
The procedure matched that from the first experiment, see
Section 3.1.3.
3.2.4 Analysis
We analysed our data fitting a Bayesian binary logistic regression
model with maximal random effects structure using the R (R Core
Team, 2020) package brms (Bürkner, 2018). The experimental
factor scenario (briefing/interrogation) and the continuous
variable evidentiality ([0, 100]), were included to predict the
probability to choose ‘know’. The factor scenario was again
sum-coded (−1 as interrogation and 1 as briefing) and
evidentiality was standardised. The model included varying
intercepts and slopes for participants and items.
We used the same priors as for the data of the first experiment:
The intercept was normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation 10. For the fixed effects, we used normal priors with a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The standard deviations
were assigned half-normal priors with amean of 0, and a standard
deviation of 1 and for the correlation matrix, we used a
LKJ(2) prior.
The sampling process was the same as for the experiment 1
analysis, see Section 3.1.4 for a detailed description. The response
‘other’ was again excluded from the analysis. As anticipated,
providing participants with a reduced set of utterances, ‘other’
was chosen more frequently than in the first experiment and
made up 19% of the data. After examining the data, ‘other’ was
often chosen when evidentiality ratings were rather low. We will
leave the analysis of these responses for future research but will
not focus on them in this study.
3.2.5 Results
Two participants were excluded for below-chance performance
on the control items. The remaining participants responded to
the control items with an accuracy of 97%.
Similar to the first experiment, in the evaluation task,
participants assessed the evidence by using the whole range of
the slider: the evidentiality measure ranged from 0 to 100, with a
mean of 73. Overall, on average ‘know’ (mean 83) was chosen for
higher evidentiality measures than ‘believe’ (mean 65), see
Table 4 for more information. Looking at the by-expression
evidentiality ratings contrasting both scenarios, it seems that the
evidentiality ratings across expressions were lower for events
mentioned in the interrogation than in the briefing; see
Figure 2. The difference seems to be more pronounced for
‘believe’. This suggests that in the briefing, stronger evidence
was needed in order for participants to choose ‘know’. In the
interrogation, however, less convincing evidence might have
sufficed.
These observations are supported by the outcome of our
analysis. The estimate of the main effect of evidentiality was
(β̂ 1.34, CrI:[1.02, 1.70]), suggesting that the probability of
saying ‘know’ increases when the speakers’ degrees of belief
increase, see Table 5 for more details. The estimate of the
scenario effect was (β̂ −0.29, CrI:[−0.50, −0.10]), suggesting
that speakers were more likely to say ‘know’ in the
Interrogation scenario than in the Briefing scenario. Thus, we
could replicate the effects we found in the first experiment.
TABLE 4 | Mean evidentiality ratings by utterance for the experiment.
Response Mean SD Median Min Max
know 83.45 27.12 91 0 100
believe 64.67 27.12 70 0 100
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We visualised the models predictions given our data in
Figure 3. In order to facilitate understanding we back-
transformed the data from log-odds to probabilities. The plot
shows the predicted probabilities of using ‘know’ for each
scenario. The x-axis represents the standardised
evidentiality ratings, whereby 0 means average evidentiality
(corresponding to 73 on the original scale). The lines represent
the means of the fixed effects and the faded area the 95%
credible intervals for the effects. The plot illustrates that with
increasing evidentiality, the probability to use ‘know’ is
predicted to increase as well. Furthermore, ‘know’ is
predicted to be more likely to be used in the Interrogation
scenario than in the Briefing scenario. For example, with an
average evidentiality rating (0 in the plot), the probability of
using ‘know’ is predicted to be approximately 0.31 in the
briefing and approximately 0.45 in the interrogation.
However, inspecting credible intervals of the posterior means,
we can see that the estimated distribution for evidentiality is further
away from 0 than the estimated distribution of scenario. This
suggests that evidentiality plays a bigger role for speakers deciding
between ‘know’ and ‘believe’ than the scenario they are in.
3.2.6 Discussion
The findings of the second experiment replicated the findings
from the first experiment: speakers seem to base their utterance
choices on their degrees of believe and moreover to adjust their
choices depending on the scenario they are in. For experiment 2
this means concretely that participants chose ‘believe’ for lower
evidentiality ratings than ‘know’ and that they were more likely to
choose ‘believe’ in the briefing than in the interrogation. One
difference between the two experiments lies in the evidentiality
ratings for ‘believe’ which were lower for the second experiment
than for the first. It is reasonable to assume that participants were
willing to use ‘believe’ for lower degrees of confidence in the
second experiment due to the lack of explicitly suggested
alternatives.
4 General Discussion
There are two different ways to interpret our findings. First,
they could suggest that in a cooperative scenario speakers want
to truthfully communicate their certainty to be as informative
and cooperative as possible. In such a scenario a speaker
chooses a particular expression based on their degrees of
belief such that, if they deem the event probability to
exceed the threshold of an expression, the speaker chooses
that expression as long as there is no other, more informative
expression. In contrast, in a scenario where speakers are faced
with an uncooperative interlocutor who might not tell the
truth, speakers might instead act strategically, and use
expressions that are associated with higher certainties such
as ‘know’ or ‘see’ in order to come across as authoritative and
confident (Hosman, 1989; Crismore and Kopple, 1997).
Alternatively, our findings could suggest that in a cooperative
scenario speakers are obliged to engage to some extent in polite
FIGURE 2 | By-expression evidentiality ratings for each scenario (briefing in blue, interrogation in red). The plot shows the median of the evidentiality ratings (line)
and the upper quartile and lower quartile (box). Whiskers extend to the scores outside the quartiles. Dots represent outliers.
TABLE 5 | Population-level estimates of the categorical regression model in log-
odds with the standard errors and 95% credible intervals.
Coefficient Posterior mean Est. Error l–95% CrI u–95% CrI R̂
Intercept −0.48 0.19 −0.87 −0.10 1.00
Evidentiality 1.34 0.17 1.02 1.70 1.00
Scenario −0.29 0.10 −0.50 −0.10 1.00
The effect scenario is the change in log-odds for the briefing (−1 interrogation, 1 briefing).
Rhat is a convergence diagnostic which compares the between- and within-chain
estimates. Values larger than 1 suggest that the chains have not mixed well.
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conversation. This would mean that, besides pursuing the aim to be
cooperative and most informative, speakers also engage in facework.
Hence, a briefing with a colleague would not only entail acting
cooperatively and conveying information to each other but also
trying not to step on each other’s toes. Recall that, in hedging
accounts and politeness theory (e.g., Fraser, 1975; Brown and
Levinson, 1987), this means that cooperative speakers tend to
downtone their utterances when communicating their certainty in
order to be polite. By contrast, in an uncooperative scenario speakers
might feel less obliged to engage in facework especially when they are
in a high-power position. Thus, instead of hedging their statements,
speakers communicate their degrees of belief directly.
While we incline toward the first explanation, we acknowledge
that the second explanation is hard to rule out experimentally,
given the putatively ubiquitous nature of facework. Although the
Briefing scenario is designed to be cooperative, in the sense of
prioritising the exchange of accurate information, politeness
considerations are doubtless still at play to some extent. These
considerations maymediate between the speaker’s degree of belief
and choice of (un)certainty expression in a way that has yet to be
fully theorised. This is due to the fact that there is no traditional
baseline condition. We purposely chose a detective story as a
cover story because it enabled us to create a coherent experiment
where being part of a cooperative and an uncooperative scenario
is plausible for the participant. Even in a more neutral context,
such as talking to a friend, conventions such as being polite will be
involved to some extent so it is unclear whether this would
constitute a suitable baseline condition.
In practice, our results suggest that speakers use (un)certainty
expressions much more dynamically than expected by a strict
threshold semantics account, if that account is coupled with
standard pragmatic assumptions about cooperativity. For
example, we did not find a fixed ordering of (un)certainty
expressions. Recall that, under these assumptions, we would
expect each expression to be restricted to evidentiality levels
between its threshold and the threshold for the next stronger
expression. For instance, given the choices of ‘think’ and ‘know’,
we would expect to see ‘think’ attested for evidentiality above the
threshold for ‘think’ and below the threshold for ‘know’. However,
we did not find a fixed ordering of the kind this model would
predict. Considering the median evidentiality rankings for each
(un)certainty expression from experiment 1, repeated below, we
found differences in their ordering between scenarios.
Briefing :
know > notice> see> believe> am sure> think
Interrogation :
know > see> am sure> notice> believe> think
FIGURE 3 | Predictions of our model given our data. Log-odds were back-transformed to probabilities (y-axis). The x-axis is the standardised evidentiality measure:
0 stands for an evidentiality of 73. An increase of one standard deviation on the standardised scale means an increase of 26 on the original scale. The lines represents the
means of the fixed effects and the faded area depicts the 95% credible interval of the fixed effects.
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As the statistical analysis above suggests, many participants
appeared to be willing to use ‘know’ for lower evidentiality ratings
in the Interrogation scenario than in the Briefing scenario. This
could be accommodated within a threshold-based account by
assuming that an individual’s threshold for the use of ‘know’ can
vary between scenarios, just as thresholds are argued to vary
between speakers in general. However, a more challenging result
for the threshold-based account is that participants frequently
used ‘believe’ for levels of evidentiality which exceeded those for
which they elsewhere used ‘know’. This is shown in Figure 4
where we plotted the by-subject utterance choices across
evidentiality ratings.
These findings could be reconciled with the threshold-based
account in a couple of ways. One possibility is to assume that an
individual’s threshold for using ‘know’ varies throughout the
experiment (or that the participants’ reported evidentiality
ratings do not correspond with the ratings on which they
based their productions at the time of utterance). Another
possibility is that speakers are simply not pragmatic in the
way we have assumed, and freely produce less informative
utterances than they are entitled to (i.e., asserting ‘believe’ in
just some specific circumstances when they could assert ‘know’),
or produce more informative utterances than are warranted
(i.e., asserting ’know’ when they do not have sufficient
confidence, by their own criteria, to license this). However, it
should be noted that the claims of threshold semantics are
difficult to falsify if we are not committed to speakers being
pragmatic in this kind of way: one could simply posit lower
FIGURE 4 | The plots show the by-participant usage of ‘know’ (purple dots) and ‘believe’ (green dots) in the two different scenarios. The y-axis represents the
individual participants, whereby each gray line belongs to one participant. Participants are ordered from top to bottom according to the lowest degree of belief for which
they used ‘know’. The x-axis represent the evidentiality measure. This way we can see the degrees of belief of the participants when choosing a particular expression. A
green dot that appears immediately to the right of a purple dot indicates a case where a speaker used ‘believe’ for stronger evidence than for which they elsewhere
used ‘know’.
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thresholds. That is to say, without this kind of assumption about a
speaker’s pragmatic behavior, the explanatory usefulness of a
threshold semantic account is vitiated.
In terms of the broader implications for theories of
communication, our results suggest that speakers choose
an utterance not only based on their perception of the
world (here their degrees of belief) but also on the effect
that their communicative action may have on the hearer.
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) claim that speakers’
intention is twofold: speakers (i) want to be understood
(informative intention), and (ii) aim to convince their
hearers to think or act in accordance with the speakers’
beliefs (communicative intention). In particular, our
results suggest that speakers are willing to make stronger
claims than appear to be semantically warranted, in a context
in which doing so could be communicatively effective in the
latter sense.
This in turn raises the question of how a hearer should act in
such a case—that is, where they suspect that a speaker is
overstating the probability that a proposition is true, according
to the usual assumptions about the meanings of (un)certainty
expressions. Sperber et al. (2010) suggested that interlocutors
automatically engage an ’epistemic vigilance’ mechanism whose
purpose is to detect misinformation, by assessing the quality and
plausibility of the communicated content as well as the reliability
of the speaker. In the Interrogation scenario, it would be rational
for a hearer to engage in an even more conscious evaluation of
credibility—that might go beyond the automatic application of
the epistemic vigilance mechanism—and opt out of the usual
cooperative assumption that the speaker’s claims are to be
accepted at face value.
Research on epistemic vigilance (e.g., Mazzarella et al., 2018)
has typically focused on cases where a proposition is categorically
accepted or rejected, so it is potentially interesting to consider
what epistemic vigilance means in the context of gradable degrees
of belief. Confronted with a claim that the speaker ‘knows’ p,
should the vigilant hearer conclude that the speaker in fact merely
‘believes’ p, or should they reject it outright?
Moreover, keeping in mind that hearers are vigilant, speakers
have to be cautious and check to what extent their utterance
coheres with the beliefs of the hearer in order to make it more
probable for their communicative intention to succeed (Sperber
et al., 2010). In our experiment, participants might have reasoned
similarly following an overall goal of gaining compliance (e.g.,
Dillard, 1990). In the Briefing scenario, for example, they might
have deemed it strategically advantageous to occasionally
communicate their degrees of belief truthfully without under-
or overstating their confidence. Here, the aim of truthfully
communicating their confidence would be to prove their
reliability which could facilitate their overall goal: briefing
their colleague successfully. Similarly, in the Interrogation
scenario, the participant might wish to be perceived as reliable,
in order to avoid the suspect engaging in epistemic vigilance and
thus discounting subsequent overstated claims. Thus, throughout
the experiment, there could be higher-order strategies in play,
which might explain participants’ varied use of (un)certainty
expressions within one scenario—the speaker may wish to give
the hearer a particular impression of how they use uncertainty
expressions, much like how a good poker player will fold on some
bad hands in order to make a subsequent bluff more effective.
This could explain participants’ varied usage of (un)certainty
expressions within one scenario. However, these claims have to be
tested further.
Moreover, it remains to be investigated whether speakers can
employ these strategies successfully, especially in the
interrogation setting where the speakers’ goal is to convince
the hearer and the hearer has a great incentive to hide the
truth. Future research may also shed light on what parts of
the communicated content hearers might refuse. Overall, our
study illustrates participants’ expectations of what someone else
would say in a given situation, and as such, indirectly gives
insights into the comprehension of (un)certainty expressions.
In the end, speakers and hearers are both interlocutors who
inevitably reason about each other and constantly exchange their
roles within their dialogue.
In the broader context of uncertainty, we could see these
interactions as attempts to reduce the interlocutors’ uncertainty
about the truth-values of various propositions under
discussion. From this point of view, a police officer’s
interrogation of a suspect could be seen as an attempt to
eliminate their subjective cognitive uncertainty as to whether
the suspect is guilty. The use of an expression that conveys a
false degree of confidence in the factuality of a
proposition—e.g., ‘I know you were there’—could be one
way of seeking confirmation of a hitherto uncertain claim,
and thus building a consensus as to what is true. The
briefing of a colleague, by contrast, does not aim at the
complete elimination of uncertainty, but toward the building
of a consensus between the interlocutors as to how (un)certain
various propositions subjectively should be, given the available
evidence. This difference potentially underlies the difference in
communicative strategies evident in our experiments.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tested the production of (un)certainty
expressions in two contrasting scenarios. The first
experiment contrasted a wide range of (un)certainty
expressions, and the second experiment focused on the
production of ‘know’ vs. ‘believe’. We found that speakers
choose between (un)certainty expressions based on their
degrees of belief, and furthermore, adjust their choices
depending on the scenario they are in. These findings
supports hedging and politeness accounts which assume
that speakers may use (un)certainty expressions
strategically. By contrast, our findings are surprising under
a strict threshold semantics accounts paired with pragmatic
assumptions about cooperativity, since we found that
speakers use (un)certainty expressions much more freely.
Besides using ‘know’ for lower evidentiality ratings in the
Interrogation scenario than in the Briefing scenario,
participants frequently used ‘believe’ for levels of
evidentiality which exceeded those for ‘know’.
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org March 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 63515613
Lorson et al. Strategic Use of (Un)certainty Expressions
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The full set of data for both experiments is available here:
https://osf.io/e5av9/.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The studies involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by the PPLS Research Ethics Committee (School of
Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences). The patients/
participants provided their written informed consent to
participate in this study.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
AL, CC, and HR contributed to conception and design of the
study. AL collected the data and performed the statistical
analysis. AL wrote the first draft of the manuscript. CC and
HR wrote sections of the manuscript. All authors contributed
to manuscript revision, read, and approved the submitted
version.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the Scottish Graduate School for Arts
and Humanities in conjunction with Scottish Funding Council.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are grateful to the reviewers for their helpful and constructive
comments.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL




Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., and Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure
for confirmatory hypothesis testing: keep it maximal. J. Mem. Lang. 68,
255–278. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001
Bürkner, P.-C. (2018). Advanced Bayesian multilevel modeling with the r package
BRMS. R. J. 10, 395–411. doi:10.32614/rj-2018-017
Berger, C. R., and Calabrese, R. J. (1975). Some explorations in initial interaction
and beyond: toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication.
Hum. Commun. Res. 1, 99–112.
Berger, C. R. (1995). Communication and social influence processes. Inscrutable
goals, uncertain plans, and the production of communicative action. Michigan:
Michigan State University Press, 1–28.
Bonnefon, J.-F., and Villejoubert, G. (2006). Tactful or doubtful?
Expectations of politeness explain the severity bias in the
interpretation of probability phrases. Psychol. Sci. 17, 747–751. doi:10.
1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01776.x
Brashers, D. E. (2006). Communication and uncertainty management. J. Commun.
51, 477–497.
Brown, P., and Levinson, S. (1987). Politeness. Some universals in language usage.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, P., and Levinson, S. (1978). “Universals in language usage: politeness
phenomena,” inQuestions and politeness. Strategies in social interactions. Editor
E. Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 56–311.
Clark, H. H. (1990). Quantifying probabilistic expressions: Comment. Stat. Sci. 5,
12–16.
Crismore, A., and Kopple, W. J. V. (1997). Hedging and discourse. Hedges and
readers: effects on attitudes and learning. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter,
83–114.
Dillard, J. (1990). A goal-driven model of interpersonal influence. Seeking
compliance: the production of interpersonal influence messages. Berlin:
Gorsuch Scarisbrick, 41–56.
Fraser, B. (1975). “Hedged performatives,” Syntax and semantics. Editors P. Cole
and J. L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press), 187–210.
Fraser, B. (2010). “Pragmatic competence: the case of hedging,” in New approaches
to hedging. Editors G. Kaltenböck, W. Mihatsch, and S. Schneider (London:
Emerald). 15–34.
Grice, H. P. (1975). “Logic and conversation,” in Syntax and semantics. Speech acts.
Editors P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press), 41–58.
Hoffman, M. D., and Gelman, A. (2013). The no-u-turn sampler: adaptively setting
path lengths in Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. J. Machine Learn. Res. 15,
1593–1623. doi:10.1186/s12711-019-0515-1
Holmes, J. (1982). Expressing doubt and certainty in English. RELC J. 14, 9–28.
Holtgraves, T., and Perdew, A. (2016). Politeness and the communication of
uncertainty. Cognition 154, 1–10. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.05.005
Hosman, L. A. (1989). The evaluative consequences of hedges, hesitations, and
intensifies powerful and powerless speech styles. Hum. Commun. Res. 15,
383–406.
Juanchich, M., and Sirota, M. (2015). A direct and comprehensive test of two
postulates of politeness theory applied to uncertainty communication.
Judgment Decis. Making 10, 232–240. doi:10.4135/9781412959384.n286
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
Knapp, P., Raynor, D. K., and Berry, D. C. (2004). Comparison of two methods of
presenting risk information to patients about the side effects of medicines.
BMJ Qual. Saf. 13, 176–180. doi:10.1136/qshc.2003.009076
Kruschke, J. K., Aguinis, H., and Joo, H. (2012). The time has come: Bayesian
methods for data analysis in the organizational sciences. Org. Res. Methods 15,
722–752. doi:10.1177/1094428112457829
Lakoff, G. (1973). Hedges: a study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy
concepts. J. Philos. Logic 2, 458–508.
Lassiter, D. (2017). Graded modality: qualitative and quantitative perspectives.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Littlejohn, S. W., Foss, K. A., and Oetzel, J. G. (2017). Theories of human
communication. 11 edn. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press.
Lorson, A., Cummins, C., and Rohde, H. (2019). “When objecting to presupposed
content comes easily,” Proceedings of the 23rd workshop on the semantics and
pragmatics of dialogue. London: SemDial, 54–60.
Mazzarella, D., Trouche, E., Mercier, H., and Noveck, I. (2018). Believing what
you’re told: politeness and scalar inferences. Front. Psychol. 9, 90. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2018.00908
R Core Team (2020). R: a language and environment for statistical computing.
Vienna, Austria: SemDial.
Schuster, S., and Degen, J. (2020). I know what you’re probably going to say:
listener adaptation to variable use of uncertainty expressions. Cognition 203,
175–200. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8w6xc
Sorensen, T., Hohenstein, S., and Vasishth, S. (2016). Bayesian linear mixed models
using stan: a tutorial for psychologists, linguists, and cognitive scientists.Quant.
Methods Psychol. 12, 175–200. doi:10.20982/tqmp.12.3.p175
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org March 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 63515614
Lorson et al. Strategic Use of (Un)certainty Expressions
Sperber, D., Clemént, F., Heintz, C., Mascaro, O., Mercier, H., Origgi, G., et al.
(2010). Epistemic vigilance. Mind Lang. 25, 359–393.
Sperber, D., and Wilson, D. (1986/1995). Relevance: communication and
cognition. Hoboken: Blackwell.
Stan Development Team (2017). Stan modeling language users guide and reference
manual. Version 2.17.0.
Wallsten, T. S., Budescu, D. V., Rapoport, A., Zwick, R., and Forsyth, B. (1986).
Measuring the vague meanings of probability terms. J. Exp. Psychol. 4, 348–365.
Yalcin, S. (2010). Probability operators. Philos. Compass 11, 916–937. doi:10.1111/j.
1747-9991.2010.00360.x
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2021 Lorson, Cummins and Rohde. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org March 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 63515615
Lorson et al. Strategic Use of (Un)certainty Expressions
